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STRIKING A FAIR BALANCE: EXTENDED JUVENILE
JURISDICTION IN NORTH DAKOTA
JENNIFER ALBAUGH* AND HALEY WAMSTAD**

ABSTRACT
Over fifty percent of states have adopted some form of extended
juvenile jurisdiction (EJJ). The purpose of EJJ is to give courts more
discretion when sentencing a juvenile offender. Depending on the
circumstances, a juvenile may receive a juvenile or adult sentence, or both.
This Article argues the need for North Dakota to adopt some form of EJJ.
Following a brief introduction, Part II outlines the history and evolution of
the juvenile justice system. Three possible EJJ methods are discussed in
Part III: voluntary, mandatory, and discretionary transfers. Part III also
discusses the process used to transfer a juvenile case and appellate review in
cases that are appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court. Part IV
illustrates the modern trend of blended sentencing defining the juvenileinclusive, juvenile-exclusive, juvenile contiguous, criminal-inclusive, and
criminal-exclusive blended sentencing model. Lastly, Part V discusses the
development of this proposed bill for EJJ in North Dakota, puts forth a
recommendation that North Dakota should adopt based on the state models,
and restates the necessity for a change in the Juvenile Court Act to include a
form of EJJ.

* Jennifer Albaugh is a Law Clerk for the South Central Judicial District at the Burleigh
County Courthouse. She received her J.D. Cum Laude from the University of North Dakota
School of Law in May 2012. Albaugh is the author of Parts II and IV of this Article.
** Haley Wamstad is an Assistant State’s Attorney in Grand Forks County. She received her
J.D. from the University of North Dakota School of Law in May 2007. Before becoming an
Assistant State’s Attorney, she served as a law clerk for the Northeast Judicial District. Wamstad
is the author of Parts III and V of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION

Juvenile courts were established to insulate juvenile offenders from the
punishment aspect focused on in adult courts, to promote rehabilitation, and
to eliminate the stigma associated with having a criminal conviction on
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their record, by characterizing such actions as delinquent rather than
criminal.1 The distinct and separate mechanism of juvenile courts
represents the nation’s belief that juvenile offenders are different than adult
offenders and therefore should be treated differently, namely in the areas of
accountability and punishment.2 At its inception, the juvenile justice
system focused on rehabilitating juvenile offenders, believing that with the
proper treatment, juvenile offenders could be turned into productive
members of society.3
In recent years, however, the juvenile justice system has come under
attack for its leniency when sentencing violent juvenile offenders. With an
increase in juvenile crime, the public has demanded the juvenile justice
system get tougher in its punishments.4 The original goals of the juvenile
justice system failed to completely materialize, forcing the juvenile justice
system to change its approach and take a retributivist turn.5 Instead of
protecting juvenile offenders, the juvenile justice system now focuses on
protecting society from juvenile offenders incapable of being rehabilitated.6
In making this change, legislators and politicians are responding by
proposing various pieces of innovative legislative action to reform the
juvenile justice system.7 The most popular of the differing propositions
consists of five different models and is collectively called blended
sentencing.8 Overall, blended sentencing focuses on balancing the
harshness of adult criminal sentences and the imposition of a less restrictive
juvenile placement. Blended sentencing provides a viable avenue to
restructure the presently troubled juvenile justice system.
The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate the need for North Dakota
to adopt some form of extended juvenile jurisdiction (EJJ). Part II outlines
the history and evolution of the juvenile justice system, indicating a shift by
juvenile courts away from the theory of rehabilitation to the theory of
retributivism after an increase in juvenile violence. The Juvenile Court Act
1. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 693-94
(1991).
2. Id.
3. Ralph A. Rossum, Holding Juveniles Accountable: Reforming America’s “Juvenile
Injustice System,” 22 PEPP. L. REV. 907, 909-11 (1995).
4. See generally Jennifer M. O’Connor & Lucinda K. Treat, Getting Smart About Getting
Tough: Juvenile Justice and the Possibility of Progressive Reform, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1299,
1303-04 (1996).
5. Feld, supra note 1, at 695-96, 701.
6. See id. at 723-24.
7. NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, DIFFERENT FROM ADULTS: AN UPDATED ANALYSIS
OF JUVENILE TRANSFER AND BLENDED SENTENCING LAWS, WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
REFORM 2 (2008), available at http://www.modelsforchange net/publications/181.
8. Brandi Miles Moore, Blended Sentencing for Juveniles: The Creation of a Third Criminal
Justice System?, 22 J. JUV. L. 126, 131 (2002).
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in North Dakota allows a juvenile case to be transferred to adult court
through three different methods, as discussed in Part III. Part III also
discusses the process used to transfer a juvenile case and the appellate
review in the cases that are appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.
Part IV illustrates the modern trend of blended sentencing defining the
juvenile-inclusive, juvenile-exclusive, juvenile contiguous, criminalinclusive, and criminal-exclusive blended sentencing model, which are the
five different models used today. North Dakota currently does not have
EJJ; however, a proposed bill will be presented to the North Dakota
Legislature in the current session. Lastly, Part V discusses the development
of this proposed bill and policy considerations, sets forth a recommendation
that North Dakota should adopt, in line with twenty-six other states, some
form of a blended sentencing model, and reiterates the need for a change in
North Dakota’s Juvenile Court Act to include a form of EJJ.
II. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEM
Even the English common law recognized that juvenile offenders were
a distinct and unique part of the population.9 Prior to the separation of
juvenile and adult courts, juveniles were prosecuted in much the same way
as adults.10 As part of the Progressive Era, separate juvenile courts were
formed.11 Progressives operated under the belief that adolescents could not
be held morally accountable for their actions.12 This belief supported the
emerging view that juvenile criminals should be treated differently than
adult criminals, because they were different.13

9. ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 137-63 (2d
ed. 1977).
10. David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, Criminal Law: “Owing to the Extreme Youth
of the Accused:” The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 641, 645-46 (2002); see also Stacey Sabo, Rights of Passage: An Analysis of
Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2429-36 (1996) (discussing
how the juvenile court system has evolved over time). Children under the age of seven were
immune from prosecution based on the infancy defense, because the law presumed they were
incapable of forming criminal intent. This presumption also applied to children between the ages
of seven and fourteen; however, the presumption could be rebutted. WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
CRIMINAL LAW 511-12 (5th ed. 2010).
11. PLATT, supra note 9, at 10-11. Illinois was the first state to form a juvenile court, due
largely to the work of the Chicago Women’s Club. ELIZABETH J. CLAPP, MOTHERS OF ALL
CHILDREN: WOMEN REFORMERS AND THE RISE OF JUVENILE COURTS IN PROGRESSIVE ERA
AMERICA 19-21, 166 (1998).
12. RICHARD LAWRENCE & CRAIG HEMMENS, JUVENILE JUSTICE 24 (2008).
13. Feld, supra note 1, at 693-94.
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By 1925, forty-eight states had created separate court systems for
juveniles designed specifically for dealing with children.14 The court in
juvenile court proceedings played a different role compared to the court’s
role in adult proceedings.15 This role overlapped with the rise of
developmental psychology, which began at the beginning of the twentieth
century.16 “Developmental psychologists postulated that the ‘condition’
underlying delinquent juvenile behavior was poor parenting and other social
ills.”17
The ultimate goal of the juvenile court system was to treat and
rehabilitate juvenile offenders.18 To meet this goal juvenile courts would
inquire into the “crime and the criminal,” and this inquiry closely resembled
the research being done in developmental psychology.19 Juvenile criminals
were viewed as more malleable than adult criminals and, therefore, were
capable of being rehabilitated.20 Rehabilitation was accomplished through
individual assessment and treatment of the juvenile offender.21
A. THE ISSUES WITH FOCUSING SOLELY ON REHABILITATION
Although the establishment of juvenile court systems was in its
infancy, the dissatisfaction grew quickly.22 The major source of this
dissatisfaction was due to the wide discretion judges retained in
sentencing.23 There was not only dissatisfaction with the sentences that
juveniles were being given, but also with the inability of juvenile courts to

14. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS:
1999 NATIONAL REPORT 86 (1999). Maine and Wyoming were the only two states that did not
have a separate juvenile court system. David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in
the Early Twentieth Century: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE 42, 45 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002).
15. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 14, at 86.
16. Emily A. Polacheck, Juvenile Transfer: From “Get Better” to “Get Tough” and Where
We Go from Here, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1162, 1166 (2009).
17. Id. at 1166. The idea of Parens Patriae was established by the belief that social ills could
be cured. Id.
18. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 14, at 86-87. In the beginning, juvenile delinquency
was seen as a disease that could be cured with the proper treatment. Rossum, supra note 3, at
909-11.
19. Polacheck, supra note 16, at 1167.
20. Ira M. Schwartz et al., Nine Lives and Then Some: Why the Juvenile Court Does Not
Roll Over and Die, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 533, 535 (1998).
21. Polacheck, supra note 16, at 1167.
22. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 14, at 87-88; see also W. Don Reader, They Grow Up
So Fast: When Juveniles Commit Adult Crimes: The Laws of Unintended Results, 29 AKRON L.
REV. 477, 480 (1996).
23. See Reader, supra note 22, at 480; see also Polacheck, supra note 16, at 1167. Judges
were given wide discretion in sentencing, because the goal was to fit the punishment to the
individual juvenile offender. Id.
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effectively and properly adjudicate juvenile claims.24 This was due
primarily to the vast number of juvenile cases.25 The goal of rehabilitation
was not being met, because juveniles were either sent to large institutions
that were ill prepared in giving individualized treatment or were given a
sentence with little or no effect.26
The decision of Kent v. United States27 directly criticized the
inadequacies of the juvenile court system.28 In 1961, Morris Kent, at
sixteen years of age, was arrested for housebreaking, robbery, and rape.29
Although Kent was a juvenile, the juvenile court judge transferred his
proceeding, without a hearing, to the U.S. District Court for the District
Court of Columbia.30 Kent was sentenced to thirty to ninety years in prison
after a jury trial found him guilty on six counts of housebreaking and
robbery.31 Kent appealed and alleged numerous grounds for reversal of his
conviction, specifically citing the juvenile court’s waiver of jurisdiction.32
The United States Supreme Court held that Kent was denied proper
procedural safeguards.33 Additionally, the Court noted that the juvenile
court’s latitude in deciding whether or not to waive jurisdiction is not
absolute.34 The Court decided that in order for a valid waiver to exist, the
petitioner was entitled to a hearing and access to the juvenile court records
that the judge had considered.35
Kent is considered a central case to the juvenile court system, because
the Court not only questioned the capabilities of the juvenile court system,
but also criticized it.36 In addition, the Court recognized in certain
circumstances waivers of juvenile crimes into adult court were
24. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 14, at 87-88; Erik K. Klein, Dennis the Menace or
Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 371, 377-78 (1998).
25. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 14, at 87-88.
26. Id. at 87.
27. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
28. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 555-56.
29. Id. at 543. Kent was a prior juvenile offender. Id. Fingerprints at the crime scene
matched those of Kent. Id. at 551.
30. Id. at 546.
31. Id. at 550.
32. Id. at 548, 551.
33. Id. at 563. The Court found both the court of appeals and district court erred in
sustaining the validity of the waiver, and remanded for a de novo district court hearing. Id.
34. Id. at 552-53.
35. Id. at 557. In Kent, the United States Supreme Court presumed that the District Court
examined not only probation reports, but also social records or other similar reports. Id. at 555.
36. See id. at 555-56 (“There is much evidence that some juvenile courts, including that of
the District of Columbia, lack the personnel, facilities and techniques to perform adequately as
representatives of the State in a parens patriae capacity, at least with respect to children charged
with law violation.”).
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appropriate.37 Secondly, the Court illustrated guidelines juvenile court
judges should use when determining whether or not to waive jurisdiction of
a juvenile proceeding.38
B. REEVALUATING JUVENILE COURTS BY SHIFTING THE FOCUS
FROM REHABILITATION TO RETRIBUTION
Following the decision in Kent, there was a shift in the attitudes of
Americans and those involved in the juvenile justice system. 39 The
attitudes began to focus less on the rehabilitation of juveniles and more on
the retributive aspect of the criminal justice system.40 Retributivism is a
theory that supports an adult criminal sentence, by putting more focus on
punishing defendants and protecting the public rather than rehabilitating
them.41 During the 1960s and 1970s, baby boomers reached their “crime
prone” years, which caused the unsubstantiated belief that juvenile crime
was more common.42

37. Id. at 551-54.
38. Id. at 566-67. The Court enumerated eight factors juvenile courts should consider when
deciding if jurisdictional waiver is appropriate. The eight factors included the following:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the protection
of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated
or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight
being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence upon which
a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment (to be determined by
consultation with the United States Attorney).
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the
juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a crime
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of
his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts with
the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other
jurisdictions, prior periods of probation to this Court, or prior commitments to juvenile
institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable
rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the alleged offense) by
the use of procedures, services and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court.
Id.
39. Kristin L. Caballero, Blended Sentencing: A Good Idea for Juvenile Sex Offenders, 19
ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 379, 388 (2005).
40. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 14, at 88.
41. IAN MARSH, CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHIES, THEORIES AND
PRACTICE 12-17 (2004).
42. DAVID L. MYERS, BOYS AMONG MEN: TRYING AND SENTENCING JUVENILES AS
ADULTS 4 (2005).
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However, between 1974 and 1981, juvenile delinquency rates did
rise.43 This increase continued steadily through the mid 1990s.44 Just as
the level and severity of juvenile violence began to catch the attention of
society and the politics, the juvenile crime rates started to decrease.45
Regardless of this decrease in juvenile crime rates, there were a few horrific
and highly publicized crimes that created the new term “super-predator.”46
New measures focused on getting tough on juvenile crime emerged as a
result of the public’s and legislature’s belief that juvenile crime was not
only on the rise, but was getting more violent and horrific.47
III. THE EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN NORTH DAKOTA
North Dakota has traditionally had a relatively low crime rate.
However, North Dakota began to get tough on juvenile crime over the span
of several decades, following a national trend. Much of the focus in North
Dakota was on a fear of increasing violent crime and serious crime, similar
to the fears expressed by other states.48
North Dakota’s Uniform Juvenile Court Act was established in 1969 in
response to the Kent and Gault decisions issued by the United State’s
Supreme Court.49 This change in North Dakota’s juvenile justice provided
for certain procedural safeguards for juveniles.50 At the time of the
enactment of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, there was no option for a
child to voluntarily transfer the child’s offense to adult court, nor was there
the option to automatically transfer certain offenses.51 But rather, the law
provided for transfer of a delinquency offense if the court found that the
child was “not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a juvenile.”52

43. Polachek, supra note 16, at 1169.
44. Lisa S. Beresford, Comment, Is Lowering the Age at Which Juveniles Can Be
Transferred to Adult Criminal Court the Answer to Juvenile Crime? A State-by-State Assessment,
37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 783, 785 (2000).
45. Caballero, supra note 39, at 389.
46. Id. at 389-99. “A superpredator is thought to have no social conscience, to exhibit
extremely violent behavior, and to be beyond the control of the juvenile court system.” Id.; see
Polachek, supra note 16, at 1169 (discussing the increased media attention juvenile crimes
received even though juvenile crime rates had gone down).
47. See infra Part.III-IV.
48. Hearing on S.B. 2264 Before the H. Judiciary Comm., 54th Legis. Assemb. 2 (N.D.
1995) [hereinafter Hearing on S.B. 2264] (testimony of Governor Schaeffer stating that North
Dakota is one of the safest states in the nation and S.B. 2264 will help to “maintain the security we
now cherish”).
49. See In re J.A.G., 552 N.W.2d 318, 324 (N.D. 1960).
50. 1969 N.D. Laws 547-48, 555-64.
51. Id. at 569.
52. Id. The option allowing a child to voluntarily transfer an offense to adult court was
provided through an amendment to the Act in 1975. 1975 N.D. Laws 831-32.
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In 1995, a Juvenile Justice Task Force (“Task Force”) was created in
response to an increase in violent juvenile crime in North Dakota.53 The
Task Force completed a study, which reported that juvenile arrests and
referral numbers had increased and that violent assaults and sexual crimes
had become a larger portion of the juvenile crimes committed in this state.54
In an effort to curb this increase, the Task Force recommended legislation,
which eased the State’s burden in transferring serious, violent crimes and
habitual offenders to adult court.55 The legislation provided for certain
serious, violent offenses to be mandatorily transferred to adult court on a
finding of probable cause.56 The legislation further provided criteria to
consider in determining whether a child is amenable to treatment in juvenile
court, which is relevant to a discretionary transfer.57
Under North Dakota’s current law, there are three methods a juvenile
case can be transferred to district court for prosecution as a criminal
offense.58 These three methods are as follows: voluntary transfer,
mandatory transfer, or discretionary transfer.59 The method that is used is
dependent on the specific offense charged and the circumstances
surrounding the child’s prior involvement with juvenile court.60 This
Article will review each type of transfer individually.
A. VOLUNTARY TRANSFER
A child charged with a delinquent offense may voluntarily transfer a
case to district court for prosecution.61 The child, however, must be sixteen
years of age or older to do so.62 This transfer applies regardless of the

53. In re M.W., 2009 ND 55, ¶ 9, 764 N.W.2d 185, 188 (citing the report “Juvenile Justice in
North Dakota: Building On Our Strengths”).
54. Id. The concern was also related to an increase in criminal street gangs. Hearing on S.B.
2264, supra note 48, at 1.
55. In re M.W., ¶ 10.
56. 1995 N.D. Laws 422-24. The automatic transfer provision was again amended in 1997 to
broaden the scope of offenses to be transferred upon a finding of probable cause for certain drug
offenses. 1997 N.D. Laws 267. This expansion in the law was made due to a concern for
increased gang activity and that some gang members use juveniles to sell drugs since juveniles
generally receive lighter penalties than adults. Hearing on S.B. 1306 Before the H. Judiciary
Comm., 55th Legis. Assemb. 3 (N.D. 1997).
57. Id.
58. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (Supp. 2011).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. § 27-20-34(1)(a).
62. Id.
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offense charged so long as it is a delinquent offense and not an unruly
offense.63
B. MANDATORY TRANSFER
For certain enumerated offenses, the juvenile court is mandated to
transfer the case to district court for prosecution as a criminal offense if the
child is fourteen years of age or older at the time the offense was
committed, and there is probable cause to believe the offense was
committed.64 The offenses that qualify for the mandatory transfer are as
follows:
[M]urder or attempted murder; gross sexual imposition65 or the
attempted gross sexual imposition of a victim by forced or by
threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping; or
the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to
manufacture or deliver a controlled substance in violation of
subdivision a or b of subsection 1 of section 19-03.1-23, except for
the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to
manufacture or deliver marijuana in an amount less than one
pound [.45 kilogram]; or the gratuitous delivery of a controlled
substance not a narcotic drug or methamphetamine which is a
singular and isolated event involving an amount of controlled
substance sufficient solely for a single personal use.66
If there is probable cause to believe the child committed one of these
offenses, the court must transfer the offense to district court for prosecution
as a criminal offense, regardless of the child’s juvenile court record, the
circumstances of the offense, or the child’s likelihood of rehabilitation in

63. Id. An “unruly child” is one who has committed a status offense, such as truancy,
absenting, or any other offense applicable only to a child. Id. § 27-20-02(19). A delinquent act,
on the other hand, is one that would be a crime under the law if committed by an adult. Id. § 2720-02(6).
64. Id. § 27-20-34(1)(b).
65. For purposes of the offense of Gross Sexual Imposition, the threats need not be directed
at the victim, but rather the threats may be directed at any human being. In re R.A., 2011 ND 119,
¶ 25-27, 799 N.W.2d 332, 339. Additionally, the offense of Gross Sexual Imposition may only be
transferred if there is probable cause to believe that offense was committed by force or by threat of
imminent death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping. In re M.W., 2009 ND 55, ¶ 12, 764 N.W.2d
185, 189. In In re M.W., the State argued that the phrase “by force or by threat of imminent death,
serious bodily injury, or kidnapping” modified only attempted Gross Sexual Imposition. Id.
66. Id. The phrase “by force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, or
kidnapping” not only applies to attempted gross sexual imposition, but also to the offense of gross
sexual imposition. Id. The legislature intended to target certain serious, violent offenses for
mandatory transfer to adult court upon a finding a probable cause. Id.
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juvenile court.67 In determining if there is probable cause to believe the
child committed the alleged offense, the court may consider hearsay or
other evidence not ordinarily admissible at a hearing on the merits of the
offense.68
C. DISCRETIONARY TRANSFER
Under certain circumstances, the juvenile court can transfer an offense
for prosecution as a criminal offense. If there are reasonable grounds to
believe the child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation in juvenile
court.69 For this type of transfer, the child must be fourteen years of age or
more at the time of the offense.70
In order to transfer the offense under this provision, the court must
make the following findings, based on reasonable grounds: (1) the child
committed the delinquent act alleged; (2) the child is not amenable to
treatment or rehabilitation through juvenile court programs; (3) the child is
not treatable in an institution for the mentally retarded or ill; and (4) the
interests of the community require that the child be placed under legal
restraint or discipline.71 “Reasonable cause” is defined as “probable
cause.”72 In order to determine if a child is amenable to treatment through
juvenile court programs, the court shall consider factors, such as the child’s
age, maturity, degree of criminal sophistication, juvenile court record, prior
attempts to treat and rehabilitate through juvenile court programs, and the
nature and circumstances of the offense.73
The burden to prove whether a child is amenable to treatment or
rehabilitation is on the state, except if the offense involves certain serious,
violent offenses listed in the statute.74 For these enumerated offenses, the
67. Id. “Probable cause,” for purposes of the transfer statute, is met if “there is a definite
probability based on substantial evidence the offense has been committed.” In re L.A.G., 1999
ND 219, ¶ 11, 602 N.W.2d 516, 520. “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.
68. N.D. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3). The transfer hearing in juvenile court is “equivalent to a
preliminary examination in a criminal case, with relaxed standards for admission of
evidence . . . .” In re L.A.G.,¶ 9, 602 N.W.2d at 519.
69. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(1)(c) (Supp. 2011).
70. Id. § 27-20-34(1)(c)(1). If the child is fourteen or fifteen years of age, the court must
make a finding that the child committed a delinquent act involving the infliction or threat of
serious bodily harm. Id. § 27-20-34(1)(c)(4)(e).
71. Id. § 27-20-34(1)(c)(4).
72. In re A.E., 1997 ND 9, ¶ 5, 559 N.W.2d 215, 216-17.
73. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(3).
74. Id. § 27-20-34(2). The burden to prove the child is amenable to treatment or
rehabilitation is on the child if the offense alleged is:
manslaughter, aggravated assault, robbery, arson involving an inhabited structure, or
escape involving the use of a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous weapon
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burden is on the child to prove that the child is amendable to treatment and
rehabilitation in juvenile court.75
D. THE PROCESS TO TRANSFER AN OFFENSE
Under the current law, the juvenile court must determine if the case
should be handled in juvenile or adult court prior to an adjudication of the
case on the merits.76 Typically, for purposes of a discretionary or
mandatory transfer, a transfer hearing is held to determine if there is
probable cause for the offense or if the child is amenable to treatment in
juvenile court. A transfer hearing is similar to a preliminary hearing in a
criminal case, where the purpose is not to determine guilt or innocence. 77
The juvenile court need not ferret through conflicting evidence or make
credibility determinations at the transfer hearing, unless the testimony is
implausible or incredible.78 But rather, the credibility determination is left
as a question of fact for the finder of fact.79
A juvenile transfer hearing does not provide the same protections as a
criminal trial, but it is a “critically important” proceeding and must provide
the juvenile with the basic protections of due process and fairness. 80 The
constitutional right to confrontation of a witness does not apply at a transfer
hearing, but rather, is a trial right.81 A transfer hearing is not an
adjudication on the merits, but rather is considered a preliminary
proceeding.82
The standard for admission of evidence is relaxed at a transfer
hearing.83 The Rules of Evidence do not apply, except the rules regarding
privileges.84 Merely because evidence has been admitted at a transfer
hearing, the child is not precluded from seeking to suppress inadmissible

or in cases in which the alleged delinquent act involves an offense which if committed
by an adult would be a felony and the child has two or more previous delinquency
adjudications for offenses which would be a felony if committed by an adult.
Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. § 27-20-34(1) (stating the court shall transfer the case “before hearing the petition on
its merits”).
77. In re R.A., 2011 ND 119, ¶ 21, 799 N.W.2d 332, 338.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. ¶ 30, 799 N.W.2d at 340 (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553-62 (1966);
In re K.G., 295 N.W.2d 323 (N.D. 1980)).
81. Id.
82. State v. Woodrow, 2011 ND 192, ¶ 13-14, 803 N.W.2d 572, 576-77.
83. In re L.A.G., 1999 ND 219, ¶ 9, 602 N.W.2d 516, 519.
84. N.D. R. EVID. 1101; see also In re R.A., ¶ 10, 799 N.W.2d at 336; In re L.A.G., ¶ 9, 602
N.W.2d at 519.
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evidence at the adjudication stage of the proceedings.85 Once an offense
has been transferred to district court and that offense has resulted in the
conviction of a crime, any future offense with respect to that same child is
prosecuted in adult court.86 Once the child has been convicted of the
offense in adult court, a juvenile court’s jurisdiction over that child is
terminated with respect to any future offense the child may commit, even if
the child is still a juvenile.87
For an offense committed by a juvenile, but not adjudicated until after
the child has reached twenty years of age, the offender can be prosecuted
for the criminal offense in district court without the need for a transfer
hearing.88 Under these circumstances, the district court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction.89 The prosecution after the offenders twentieth
birthday, however, cannot be an intentional delay by the State in order to
avoid juvenile court jurisdiction.90 Two prior transfer hearings, which were
subsequently appealed and reversed by the North Dakota Supreme Court, is
not considered an intentional delay by the prosecution.91
E. APPELLATE REVIEW
An aggrieved party may appeal a transfer order to the North Dakota
Supreme Court.92 The court reviews a transfer order under a clearly
erroneous standard of review.93 The appellate court will give “due
regard . . . to the opportunity of the juvenile court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses.”94 The court has also stated that the review of a juvenile
court’s order is similar to a de novo standard of review in that the court
independently reviews the evidence.95

85. In re L.A.G., ¶ 9.
86. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(4) (Supp. 2011).
87. Id. § 27-20-34(5).
88. Id. § 27-20-34(8). Juvenile court jurisdictions extends only until the child reaches age
twenty. See id. § 27-20-02(4)(b) (defining “child” as a person “under the age of twenty years with
respect to a delinquent act committed while under the age of eighteen years”); Id. § 27-20-31
(referencing dispositional options for a delinquent child).
89. State v. M.B., 2010 ND 57, ¶ 2, 780 N.W.2d 663, 664.
90. Id.; N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(8).
91. State v. Woodrow, 2011 ND 192, ¶ 16, 803 N.W.2d 572, 577. In Woodrow, the State did
not intentionally delay the prosecution when the State initially charged the defendant in juvenile
court, attempted to transfer the offenses pursuant to section 27-20-34(1)(b) and (1)(c)(4), then
filed charges in district court pursuant to section 27-20-34(8) once the child turned twenty-yearsold and juvenile court lost jurisdiction over the child. Id.
92. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-56 (2006).
93. In re R.A., 2011 ND 119, ¶ 4, 799 N.W.2d 332, 334 (citing In re A.R., 2010 ND 84, ¶ 5,
781 N.W.2d 644, 647).
94. Id.
95. In re A.E., 1997 ND 9, ¶ 3, 559 N.W.2d 215, 216.
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IV. BLENDED SENTENCING – THE MODERN TREND
The modern trend in states is to utilize some form of blended
sentencing, which grants judges expanded sentencing authority.96 “Blended
sentencing emerged during a period of steadily increasing violent juvenile
crime as a compromise between those who wanted to emphasize public
safety, punishment, and accountability of juvenile offenders and those who
wanted to maintain or strengthen the traditional juvenile justice system.”97
Blended sentencing deals with a juvenile offender’s ultimate disposition
and allows a juvenile court to sentence juvenile offenders to juvenile or
adult criminal sanctions or both.98
Blended sentencing statutes operate in two different respects. In
juvenile blended sentencing, a juvenile court can impose both a juvenile
and criminal sanction, but the juvenile’s behavior and compliance
determine which sentence will be imposed.99 If the juvenile abides by the
juvenile sentence then he or she will remain in the juvenile justice
system.100 However, if the juvenile offender does not comply with the
juvenile sentence, the criminal sentence that was previously given may take
effect.101 Although the policies underlying blended sentencing were
devised to incarcerate juvenile offenders adjudicated of committing violent
crimes for a longer period of time, there may be certain situations where
juveniles serve less time.102
Criminal blended sentencing laws represent the second type of blended
sentencing statutes.103 This gives criminal courts the opportunity to
sentence juvenile offenders to dispositions generally reserved to juvenile
courts, even though they have been transferred to adult court.104 Although
the potential for a juvenile disposition is conditioned upon the offender’s
96. NAT’L CTR FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 2. At the end of 1995, there were
sixteen states with blended sentencing statutes in place, but by the end of 2004, at least twenty-six
states had implemented some form of blended sentencing statute. FRED CHEESMAN, NAT’L CTR.
FOR STATE COURTS, A DECADE OF NCSC RESEARCH ON BLENDED SENTENCING OF JUVENILE
OFFENDERS: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED ABOUT “WHO GETS A SECOND CHANCE?” 113 (2011),
available at http://www ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/future-trends-2011/home/SpecialPrograms/~/media/Microsites/Files/Future%20Trends/Author%20PDFs/Cheesman.ashx.
97. CHEESMAN, supra note 96, at 113.
98. Id.
99. See Polachek, supra note 16, at 1173 (discussing the operation of blended sentencing
statutes).
100. Id. “Blended sentencing offers juvenile offenders a last chance within the juvenile
system by providing an incentive to respond to treatment in order to avoid the consequences of an
adult sentence.” CHEESMAN, supra note 96, at 113 (citations omitted).
101. Polacheck, supra note 16, at 1173.
102. Moore, supra note 8, 131.
103. CHEESMAN, supra note 96, at 113.
104. Polacheck, supra note 16, at 1173.
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cooperative behavior, there is a belief that criminal blended sentencing is
more lenient.105
A. MODELS OF BLENDED SENTENCING
Blended sentencing authority can be exclusive, inclusive, or
contiguous.106 In an exclusive blended sentencing model a judge has the
discretion to impose either a juvenile or an adult sentence.107 That sentence
is made effective immediately.108 The inclusive blended sentencing model
allows a judge to “impose both a juvenile and an adult sanction.”109
Generally, the adult sentence would remain suspended, unless the juvenile
committed a subsequent violation.110 The last type is called the contiguous
blended sentencing model.111 This model allows a juvenile court judge to
impose a sentence that begins in the juvenile system, but extends beyond
the maximum age of the extended juvenile court jurisdiction.112 When the
maximum age is reached the offender would be transferred to an adult
correctional system to finish out the imposed sentence.113
There are five different models of blended sentencing that have
emerged from recent legislation.114 These different models are juvenileexclusive blend, juvenile-inclusive blend, juvenile contiguous blend
criminal-exclusive blend, and criminal-inclusive blend.115 In the first three
varieties, the juvenile court “retains responsibility for adjudicating the

105. Id. at 1174. This belief is due to the fact that even though a youth has been transferred
to adult court they may receive a juvenile disposition, which is arguably more rehabilitative than
punitive in nature. Id.
106. CHEESMAN, supra note 96, 113.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO
SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 11-14 (1996). There is also a New York Model, but it
will not be discussed in detail. The New York Model is used primarily for adolescents in criminal
court. It allows the criminal sentence to be suspended while the juvenile participates in an
alternative to an incarceration program. Successful juveniles avoid a criminal sentence, upon
successful completion of the alternative. Megan M. Sulok, Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile
Prosecutions: To Revoke or Not to Revoke, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 215, 243 (2007).
115. Moore, supra note 8, at 131; see also CHEESMAN, supra note 96, at 114 (identifying the
five different varieties of blended sentencing used across the United States).
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case.”116 The second two varieties leave responsibility with the criminal
court.117
1.

Juvenile-Exclusive Blend Sentencing

The juvenile-exclusive blend allows a juvenile court to impose either a
juvenile or adult sentence.118 At the outset, the juvenile court retains
original jurisdiction, but upon adjudication or a finding of guilt, the juvenile
court judge may impose either a juvenile or adult sentence. 119 When an
adult sentence is imposed, the juvenile can be sentenced to the adult
mandatory for the convicted offense.120 However, when the offender is
given a juvenile sentence, the offender may be sentenced to two years or
until the age of 18, whichever is longer.121
New Mexico,122
Massachusetts,123 and Michigan124 utilize this type of blended
sentencing.125
2.

Juvenile-Inclusive Blend Sentencing

The juvenile-inclusive blend126 allows the juvenile court judge to
impose both a juvenile and adult sentence.127 Generally, the adult sentence
is suspended.128 This blended sentencing option “provide[s] a viable
dispositional option for juvenile court judges facing juveniles who have
committed serious or repeat offenses and to give juveniles one last chance
at success in the juvenile system, with the threat of adult sanctions as a

116. Moore, supra note 8, at 131. At the end of 1997, nine of the twenty states with blended
sentencing authority left the responsibility of sentencing with the juvenile judge. CHEESMAN,
supra note 96, at 114.
117. Moore, supra note 8, 131. There were nine states that placed authority in criminal court
judges when exercising blended sentencing following a juvenile’s conviction. CHEESMAN, supra
note 96, at 114. Blended-sentencing options were given to both juvenile and criminal court judges
in Colorado and Michigan. Id.
118. CHEESMAN, supra note 96, at 114.
119. Moore, supra note 8, at 132.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-2-20, -23 (2011).
123. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, §§ 58, 74 (2008).
124. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.18(1)(m) (West 2012).
125. RICHARD E. REDDING & JAMES C. HOWELL, BLENDED SENTENCING IN AMERICAN
JUVENILE COURTS, in CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 145, 146, 149, tbl.4.3 (Jeffery
Fagan & Franklin Zimring eds., 2000).
126. Normally, the juvenile court will retain jurisdiction over the juvenile offender until they
reach the age of 21. Moore, supra note 8, at 133.
127. CHEESMAN, supra note 96, at 114.
128. Id. The adult sentence is suspended, unless the juvenile offender violates the
dispositional order or commits a new offense. Moore, supra note 8, at 133.
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disincentive.”129 Illinois,130 Kansas,131 South Dakota,132 Minnesota,133
Alaska,134 Arkansas,135 Connecticut,136 Michigan,137 Montana,138
Vermont,139 and Ohio140 have adopted the juvenile inclusive blend
sentencing.141
3.

Juvenile Contiguous Blend Sentencing

The states following the juvenile contiguous blended sentencing model
impose a juvenile sentence; however, this juvenile sentence extends beyond
the age of the states EJJ.142 When the age of extended jurisdiction is
reached, the juvenile court decides whether or not the juvenile offender
should serve the remainder of the sentence in an adult correctional
institute.143 Texas,144 Massachusetts,145 Rhode Island,146 Colorado,147 and
South Carolina148 have enacted statutes following the juvenile contiguous
blended sentencing.149
4.

Criminal-Exclusive Blend Sentencing

In criminal-exclusive blended sentencing a criminal court can choose
to impose either an adult or juvenile sentence.150 Generally, if an adult
court determines a juvenile sentence is appropriate then the juvenile
offender is adjudicated delinquent and committed to a juvenile facility.151
129. Id. at 132-33 (quoting PATRICIA TORBET ET AL.,OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE &
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT CRIME (1996)).
130. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-810 (West Supp. 2012).
131. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2347 (Supp. 2011).
132. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-11-4 (West Supp. 2012).
133. MINN. STAT. § 260B.130 (2012). Blended sentencing in Minnesota is referred to as
Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction or EJJ. Moore, supra note 8, at 132-33.
134. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.12.065 (West 2007).
135. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-306 (Supp. 2009), -506 (2008).
136. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46B-133c (West Supp. 2009).
137. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.18 (West 2012).
138. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1602 (2012).
139. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 5201- 5293 (West Supp. 2011).
140. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2152.121, 2152.13, 2152.14 (West 2012).
141. Moore, supra note 8, at 132-33.
142. CHEESMAN, supra note 96, at 114.
143. Id.
144. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.04 (Supp. 2012).
145. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, §§ 58, 74 (2008).
146. R.I. GEN LAWS § 14-1-7.3 (Supp. 2011).
147. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-2-601, 19-2-907 to -908, 19-2-910 to -911 (2012).
148. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-19-1210 (2010).
149. CHEESMAN, supra note 96, at 114.
150. Id.
151. Moore, supra note 8, at 134.
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On the other hand, if the adult court imposes an adult sentence then the
offender is sentenced as an adult and transferred to a correctional facility.152
Virginia,153 West Virginia,154 Colorado,155 Florida,156 California,157
Idaho,158 Michigan,159 and Oklahoma160 utilize the criminal-exclusive
blended sentencing model.161
5.

Criminal-Inclusive Blend Sentencing

The last type of blended sentencing allows a criminal court to sentence
a juvenile offender to both an adult and a juvenile sentence.162 However,
the adult sentence is typically suspended.163 Criminal-inclusive blended
sentencing is similar to juvenile-inclusive blended sentencing.164 The only
difference is that in criminal-inclusive blended sentencing adult courts
retain jurisdiction over the offender, rather than the juvenile court.165
Virginia,166 Florida,167 Arkansas,168 Michigan,169 and Iowa170 are the five
states that utilize the criminal-inclusive blended sentencing model.171
V. RECOMMENDATION
A fundamental principal of juvenile law is the ability to tailor the
disposition for the particular child based on the circumstances of the offense
and the child’s situation.172 Juvenile courts are often asked to strike a
balance between providing for the care and rehabilitation of the child and

152. Id.
153. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-272 (2010).
154. W. VA. CODE § 25-4-6 (2002).
155. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-907 (2012).
156. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 985.56, .565 (2012).
157. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707.01 (Deering Supp. 2012).
158. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-509 (2004).
159. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 712A.18(1)(m)-712A.18g (West 2012).
160. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 2-2-401 to 2-2-403 (2009).
161. CHEESMAN, supra note 96, at 114.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Moore, supra note 8, at 135.
165. Id.
166. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-272 (2010).
167. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.565 (2012).
168. ARK CODE ANN. § 9-27-306 (Supp. 2012).
169. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.18(1)(m) (West 2012).
170. IOWA CODE § 907.3A (2012).
171. CHEESMAN, supra note 96, at 114.
172. State ex rel. D.R., 51 So. 3d 121, 124 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2010); see also N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 27-20-31 (2006) (“[T]he court may make any of the following orders of disposition best suited
to the child’s treatment, rehabilitation, and welfare . . . .”).
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the protection of the public.173 These hallmarks of juvenile justice are
difficult to accomplish under a framework that gives little or no
consideration to the specific circumstances of a case or child.
A. AN IMPERFECT SYSTEM
Under North Dakota’s current transfer statute, little discretion is left to
the court or the parties in determining what type of disposition is the most
appropriate or effective in a particular case.174 For those offenses
qualifying for automatic transfer, the prosecutor has discretion to determine
the offense that is charged, which in turn determines if the case is
prosecuted in juvenile or adult court.175 In this situation, prosecutors are
expected to see into the future to determine if an adult or juvenile
disposition is most appropriate. Oftentimes, if a child has committed a
serious, violent offense, but his juvenile court record is minimal or
nonexistent, the determination of whether the case should be transferred to
adult court is difficult.
Additionally, the discretionary transfer is difficult to obtain in cases
where the child has no prior involvement with juvenile court. The
discretionary transfer requires a finding that the child is not amenable to
treatment or rehabilitation in juvenile court.176 This element is often shown
through the child’s prior juvenile court programs and his level of success in
those programs.177 For example, if a child is charged with involuntary
manslaughter, but has no prior record in juvenile court, that case may not
meet the criteria for transfer to adult court.
B. AN UNFAIR RESOLUTION
Whether a child is prosecuted as an adult or juvenile poses significant
differences for both the child and the safety of the public. For example, if a
child fourteen years or older is charged with gross sexual imposition by
173. See In re Hamill, 271 A.2d 762, 765 (Md. App. 1970) (“[T]he juvenile court is to make
disposition so as to provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical
development of the child; by a program of treatment, training and rehabilitation ‘consistent with
the protection of the public interest.”).
174. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (Supp. 2011). This is particularly true for an
automatic transfer as the statute provides that “the court before hearing the petition on its merits
shall transfer the offense . . . [if] there is probable cause to believe the child committed the alleged
delinquent act.” Id. § 27-20-34(1) (emphasis added). However, even under a discretionary
transfer, the court must also make certain findings, such as if the child is amenable to treatment or
rehabilitation through juvenile programs. Id. § 27-20-34(1)(c). This requirement is often difficult
to prove if the child has no prior involvement with juvenile court programs.
175. See id. § 27-20-34(1).
176. Id. § 27-20-34(1)(c)(4)(b).
177. Id. § 27-20-34(3).
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force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping,
the offense would transfer to adult court upon a finding of probable
cause.178 This offense imposes a minimum mandatory sentence of twenty
years’ imprisonment with probation supervision to follow the
incarceration.179 In addition to the sentence, the child would also be
required to comply with lifetime registration as a sex offender.180
Conversely, if the child was charged with a lesser offense in an effort
to avoid the mandatory transfer provision, he or she would likely face a
much less significant disposition than that imposed in adult court. In
juvenile court, the maximum sentence imposed on any delinquency offense
is twelve months.181 This order can be extended in increments of twelve
months upon a finding that the extension is necessary for the treatment or
rehabilitation of the child.182 However, a juvenile court’s jurisdiction over a
child terminates on the child’s twentieth birthday.183
This example exhibits the drastic differences between each disposition
that could be imposed. Neither disposition may be appropriate for the
offender or the public. The adult sentence creates the risk that the child
may be over-punished for the offense charged. However, the juvenile
disposition may not provide for sufficient time to adequately treat and
rehabilitate the child and protect the public from a serious, violent offender.
C. STRIKING A FAIR BALANCE
Presently, the North Dakota Legislature is contemplating a method of
blended sentencing for juvenile offenders.184 Blended sentencing would
provide a middle ground between the grave sanctions of adult court and the
limited jurisdiction of juvenile court.185 The proposed legislation provides a
juvenile with “one last chance” in juvenile court and an opportunity to

178. Id. § 27-20-34(1)(b). The offense of Gross Sexual Imposition by force or by threat of
imminent death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping is classified as a class AA felony. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03(3)(a) (2012).
179. Id. § 12.1-20-03(3)(a). The court may deviate from this sentence if it finds that there is
manifest injustice in the sentence and the defendant has accepted responsibility for the offense.
Id.
180. Id. § 12.1-32-15(2)(a), (8)(c).
181. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-36(2) (Supp. 2011).
182. Id. § 27-20-36(2)(a).
183. Id. § 27-20-36(6).
184. S.B. 2035, 63d Legis. Assemb. (N.D. 2013).
185. CHEESMAN, supra note 96, at 113 (explaining that blended sentencing serves “as a
compromise between those who wanted to emphasize public safety, punishment, and
accountability of juvenile offenders and those who wanted to maintain or strengthen the traditional
juvenile justice system”).
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comply with a juvenile sentence before an adult sentence could be
imposed.186
The proposed legislation is a juvenile-inclusive model.187 This would
allow the juvenile court judge to impose a juvenile sentence and an adult
sentence, with the latter being stayed or suspended.188 So long as the child
complies with the conditions of the juvenile sentence, the adult sentence is
never imposed. Conversely, if the child fails to comply with the juvenile
conditions, that sentence can be revoked and the adult sentence imposed, at
the discretion of the juvenile court judge. Even though the child is initially
sentenced as a juvenile, the child would receive all of the adult criminal
procedural safeguards, such as the right to a jury trial.
Research shows adolescent brains do not fully develop until about the
age of twenty-five.189 As a result, trends in juvenile justice legislation
shows that transfer statutes are being modified to give more discretion to
juvenile court judges to determine the most appropriate disposition.190 On
the other hand, greater discretion presents the risk of potential bias in
decision making.191
Transferring a child to adult court should be used as a last resort.
Research suggests that prosecuting youth in the adult system results in a
higher recidivism rate and an increase cost to the government. The
proposed legislation removes all of the mandatory transfers to adult court,
except for murder and attempted murder, and places those offenses under
extended juvenile jurisdiction.
The transfer of a case to adult court or blended sentencing should be
used on an infrequent basis. However, the infrequency of its usage does not
diminish the importance of this sentencing alternative. The use of blended
sentencing in those few cases would make a substantial difference for both
the child and the safety of society.
VI. CONCLUSION
North Dakota’s juvenile justice system has adopted the mission of
“balanced and restorative justice.”192 The intent of this approach is to
186. See id. (reporting that blended sentencing gives a child an incentive to comply with
treatment in juvenile court in order to avoid the imposition of the adult sentence).
187. S.B. 2035, 63d Legis. Assemb. (N.D. 2013).
188. Id.
189. SARAH ALICE BROWN, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, TRENDS IN JUVENILE
JUSTICE STATE LEGISLATION 2001-2011, at 3 (2012).
190. Id. at 5.
191. Cheesman supra note 96, at 116 (suggesting objective risk-and-needs assessments be
used to assist in identifying the most appropriate candidates for blended sentencing).
192. NORTH DAKOTA JUVENILE COURT BEST PRACTICES MANUAL 1.1.
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balance the offenders’ need for treatment and rehabilitation with the safety
of the community.193 To appropriately strike this balance, the juvenile
justice system must be flexible and must carefully consider each particular
situation.
The adoption of a blended sentencing system would provide for
rehabilitation and accountability for the child, and protect the public from
serious, violent offenders that have failed in the juvenile justice system. If
passed, S.B. 2035 would give juvenile offenders one last chance to
participate in appropriate juvenile programs before facing the more serious
consequences of an adult court sentence. Unlike our current law, blended
sentencing would allow the juvenile justice professionals to wait and see
which disposition is most effective and appropriate for the child. The
implementation of such approach would provide a more fair result by
balancing the interests of the child and society.

193. Id.

